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though it occurs in a location not
or controlled by the employer.
[4] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Place of Injury.--In order that an
employee may be considered as being on her
ises at the time of injury, it is not
the
be circumscribed
walls or
under the
[5] Id.-Evidence.---On a hearing of an application for an award
for injuries su:stained by a counselor of Girl Scouts while on a
recreational horseback ride during her free
a letter
written by the exe<'utive director of the county Girl Scout
Council to the counselor's attorney containing a statement that
the counselor's recreation was considered a part of the compensation and that it "was so intended" at the time of employment should have been admitted in evidence when it was
offered in the director's absence, but refusal to admit it did
not constitute prejudicial error where the director testified at
a later hearing to the same effect.
[6] Id.-Certiorari-Review.-Where there is no real dispute as
to the facts, whether an injury was suffered in the course of
employment is a question of law and a purported finding of
fact on that question is not binding on a reviewing court.

PHOCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission denying compensation for personal injuries.
Order annulled.
Hennigan & Ryueal for Petitioner.
Everett A. Corten, Bdward A. Sarkisian and Herlihy &
Herlihy for Respondents.
CARTER, ,J.-This is a proceeding to review an order of
the Industrial Accident Commission which denied an application for compensation for personal injuries on the ground
that said injuries were not suffered in the course of employment.
Petitioner, Joanne Reinert, a minor, was employed by the
Central Orange County Girl Scout Council at a camp which
it conducted for Girl Scouts in the San Bernardino }\fountains.
Mrs. Mary K. Scholler was executive director of the council,
camp director of the summer camp and was in charge of
employment for the council. Although the council had conducted summer camps in previous years, this was the first
time at this particular location which had been leased for
the season from a church. The leased camp grounds com-
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5 acres on which were located the main lodge,
sleeping
Almost
were located off the camp
, 1954, ·when petitioner and Mrs. Scholler discussed
Mrs. Scholler explained that horseback
assistant counselor
younger Girl Scouts
be
of her duties; that while on such duty she
pay no charge for the horse; that when she had any
time she would be privileged, upon obtaining permission
Mrs. Scholler, to go riding. Petitioner was told by
Scholler at the time of the interview that part of the
for the work was the availability of recreational
as a counselor which would not otherwise be available to her. Petitioner was engaged as assistant waterfront
dirPctor by the council by a written contract covering the
from June 30th, 1954, to July 30th, 1954, at a wage
for the period. She was informed that this ·wage
would not come "close" to paying for all the services she
rendered but it was hoped that while at camp she would be
abh· to take advantage of all the recreational facilities available; that it was hoped that ''you will also have been comto some extent" by those recreational facilities. 'I' he
fact that petitioner enjoyed horseback riding and intended to
engagP in that sport >vas discussed at the interview.
employee was on duty 24 hours a day except for one
24-bour period each week. During the on-duty hours if the
was not needed for the actual work of the camp
slw
upon obtaining permission, engage in recreational
actiYities of her own choosing. When her duties so permitted,
slw was required to obtain permission for the precise recreariuual activity a\Yay from the camp in which she wished to
Prior to her injury, petitioner had gone horseback riding
six times, three of them without charge to her because
shto rode as a counselor accompanying Girl Scouts and three
t
for her own recreation for which she was charged a
rt'riuced rate of $1.00 per hour by the stable. Horses were
at vvilson 's Stables located a half mile from the
camp through an arrangement whereby the campers and counselors could ride at a lower rate than that charged the general

soJlh'

July 30th, the day petitioner received her injuries, the
group of Girl Scouts had left the camp at around noon.
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counselors aiso left at that
but
and other counselors
to close up camp, pack the
ment and prepare it for
into trucks which were to
Petitioner and some of the other connMrs. Scholler, had made plans a day or two
earlier to go for a final horseback ride and swim
the
aftrrnoon of the 30th after which
were to return to
camp for the final
and clearing up
to loading.
Mrs. Scholler received a call elsewhere and was unable to go
on the ride but granted permission to petitioner and the other
younger counselors to go on the horseback ride.
At ·wilson's Stables petitioner mounted a horse chosen for
her by the attendant at the stable and started off to ride along
a bridle path n0arest to the camp. After a few minutes the
horse bolted and petitioner was thrown to the ground and
rendered unconscious. She was discovered later and taken
to a hospital.
Petitioner's injuries are not in dispute. She is paralyzed
and will remain so for the rest of her life. Tn addition to
the transection of the spinal cord, she suffered broken ribs,
broken maxilla, traumatic heart damage and lung damage.
The only question involved here is whether petitioner's
injuries were suffered in the course of her employment. Respondents argue that they were not because of two factors:
( 1) That the accident occurred while petitioner was riding
for her own recreation; and (2) that it occurred at a location
off the premises of the employer and not under its control.
Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that an injury is
compensable even though it arose from an activit~- not primarily for the benefit of the employer, provided that such
activity is related to the employment or contemplated as part
of the employment, and that the fact that the injury occurred
on premises not directly owned or controlled by the employer
is immaterial so long as the injury arose out of the employment.
The day the accident occurred, July 30th, was covered
by the terms of the written contract entered into between
petitioner and her employer and is sufficient to show that her
employment had not terminated despite the argument of reRpondents that petitioner "volunteered" to remain and assist
in the closing of the camp and the packing and loading of the
equipment. We have then to determine whether the recreational horseback ride for which petitioner was granted permission was contemplated as part of her employment.

r
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allC\ their eonr~:;;dors.
lndcm. Co. . Industria!
26 Ca1.2d
P .2d G25 , where an ('lll
in a n:servoir whilf: on his way to hi'l employer's
collect his pay, vve held: '"l'he mrre fad that an
ic: performing a. personal act when illjured (loes not
him without the purview of tlw compensation
hl\'
'!'he te;;t is slated in Employers' efc. Corp. v. Industrial
Com., :n CaL\pp.2d 567, :J7:l [!J9 P.2d 10891: 'The lrne
hr deriwd from the casPs is t}J at Uw injury is comif receiw•r1 while the employee is doing thosr reasonwhieh his contraet of cmploymrnt expressly or
authori11es him to do.' " In Phocni;{ Indem.. Co. v.
Iw!trsfl'ial Ace. Com., ill Cal.2d 8GG, 861 [1D3 P.2d 74:3], wherf:
a :lot ·was killed while taking llis you11g d~mghter for an airride, 'We held that: " .. although it may be conceded
th;ti Hamilton \Yas deriving a prrsonal benefit from i he flight
his clanght er 's aptitude for flying, this 'does
se bring him without the puniew of the (:ompemation
la\\
. '"J'he trne rule . . . is that the injnry is eompenil rreeivecl while the employee iN r1oing those reasonable
whid1 his ,<ontract of employment expressly or impliedly
ai!!J,\rizes him to do."' (Pacific Indcm. Co. Y. lnclusiriaJ
.A
26 Cal.2d 509, 513 il69 P.2d 625] ). Benefits to
, or to the employee, are not mutually exclusive,
lUI': 'where the rmployee is eo:nbining his O\Yll bnsiness with
his employer, or attrm1ing to both at snbstantially the
no nice inquiry ·will be made as to ·which business
aetually c11gaged in at the time of injnry, nnless it
appears that ll(~ither c\irrct.ly or indirectly could he
ly\en serving his employer.' ( Locklwed Aircraft Corp. v.
slrial Ace. Com., 28 Ca1.2d 7GG, 758-9 fJ72 P.2c1 Jl.)"
Cas. Inrlmn. Exch. v. lndnsfrial Ace. Corn., 21
7:)1, 738, 760 [135 P.2d 158], the in:jured employee
implied consent of her employer to go on personal
<

46 C.2d-12
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errands
working hours. The court there said that it
was not indispensable to recovery that the employee be
rendering service to his employer at the time of the injury
if the act was contemplated by the employment. It was there
held that any reasonable doubt as to whether an act was
contemplated by the employment, in view of this state's liberal
policy of construction in favor of the employee, should be
resolved in favor of the employee. (See also Heaton v.
Kerlan, 27 Cal.2d 716, 720 [166 P.2d 857] ; Employers' etc.
Cm·p. v. Indust1·ial Ace. Com., 37 Cal.App.2d 567 [99 P.2d
1089] ; IV estern Pipe etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 49
Cal.App.2d 108 [121 P.2d 35] .) The record here clearly
shows that petitioner's wage was low; that it had been difficult to procure counselors for the camp ; that it was specifically
contemplated by the employer that the use of the available
recreational facilities was considered "compensation" for the
long hours and exacting work.
The present case, although a much stronger one factually,
is very like that of Winter v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 129 Cal.
App.2d 174, 176, 177 l276 P.2d 689], where the court annulled
an order of the commission which denied 'lompensation to a
caddy who lost an eye as a result of being struck by a
golf balL The caddy was permitted to play, without charge
on his day off, on the golf course where he was employed.
At the time of his employment, the caddy did not know that
such permission could be obtained. It was during such free
play on his day off when he received his injury. The court
held that the injury was sustained in the course of petitioner's
employment; that it was not indispensable to recowry that
the employee be rendering a service to the employer at the
time of injury; and as an additional argument in favor of
recovery, the court said: ''The essential prerequisite to
compensation is that the danger from which the injury results
be one to which he is exposed as an employee in his particular
employment. (lndustrialindem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn.,
95 Cal.App.2d 804, 809 [214 P.2d 41] .) " The court said,
further, that "He [petitioner] was engaged at the time in a
recreational activity, both permitted and, in the light of the
facts, sufficiently encouraged by the employer, which permission and encouragement were conditioned solely upon the fact
that he was a caddy employed by the club. For that reason,
and for no other, he was permitted to play on the course . . . .
Concerning recreational activities, and as to when injuries
sustained therein are compensable, this rule is laid down in

(f
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.. activities are
They occur on the premises during a
period as a regular incident of the emsays the author, is whether or not the
'is an
and normal one, since
becomes a regular incident and condition of the
. . . 'fhe
must be shown to have achiPved
as a custom or practice either in the industry
or in this particular plaee.
' " In Satchell v.
Ace.
94 Cal.App.2d 473, 478 [210 P.2d 867],
an employee died after having· drunk cleaning fluid
it was whiskey, the court said that the drinking of
nuder the circumstanees related 1vas to be anticipated
the conditions of his employment, and held that ''It
is too well settled to admit of question that an injury is
if the employee is at the time engaged in doing
he might reasonably have been expected to do while
performance of his duty. (Leffert v. Industrial Ace.
219 Cal. 710 [28 P.2d 911]; Pacific Indcm. Co. v.
Ace. Com., 26 Oal.2d 509, 513 [159 P.2a 625];
Lockheed A£rcraft Corp. v. Industrial Ace. C01n., 28 Oal.2d
75fi [172 P.2d 1] ; Elliott v. Indttstrial Ace. Com., 21 Cal.2d
281 [181 P.2d 521, 144 A.L.R 358] .) " (See also Industrial
Inrlem. Co. v. Industn·az Ace. Com., 95 Oal.App.2d 804, 809
P.2d 41]; City & County of San Ii'rancisco v. lrldustrial
"ice. Cow., 61 Oal.App.2cl 248, 261 [142 P.2d 760]; lVhiting.llnrd Commercial Co. v. Ind?tstrial Ace. Com., 178 Cal. 505,
;)()8 [173 P. 1105, 5 A.L.R. 1518] .) [1] We conclude,
that recreational horseback riding was considered
by both employer and employee as part of the compensation;
tha such consideration v\·as the practice of the employer; and
tlwt the dangee from which the injury resulted was "one
to \\·hich he [ tlw employee J is exposed as an employee in
his partieular <>mployment."
(Winter v. Industrial Ace.
Cmn., 129 Cal.App.2d 174, 176 [276 P.2d 689]; Associated
Iudnn.
Y. l!ldustrial Ace. Com., 18 Oal.2d 40, 44 [112
P
GJ51; CalifoJ·nia Cas. Indcm.. Exch. v. Industrial Ace.
Co111
190 Cal. 43:3, 436 [213 P. 257].) Here, as in the Winter
cas".
itioner 's i11juries arose from the very risk to which
she
exposed as part of her dnties····riding as a <·ounselor
the Oirl Scouts.
"\s we held i11 Truck Ins. E:n~l1. \'. Industn:at Ace.
27 Oal.2d 813,819 [167 P.2d 705], "An employe cannot
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be
to
relieve the employer
were in+"""""
to receive the
contract of employment,' and 'The medium of
which wages
to be paid is a mere accidental
to cloud the issue.'
stance and should not be
Fund v. Industrial Ace.
, supra, 194
34-35
P.
Indern. Co. v.
Ace. Corn.
Cal.2d 514 (159
625)].)"
The second argument made
is that the
injury occurred off the employer's premises in a location not
directly owned or controlled
and that the cases of
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 39 Cal.2d
529 [247 P.2d 707], and Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Ace. Corn., 39 Cal.2d 512 [247 P.2d 697], are directly in
point. In both cases employees engaging in recreational activities during time off from work were injured off the employer's
premises. Both cases are readily distinguishable from the one
under consideration. In the Fireman's Fund case, the employee was injured off the employer's premises where her
activities would not normally take her; neither were such
activities contemplated at the time of employment as part
of her compensation. In the case at bar, it was contemplated
at the time of employment that the very activity causing
petitioner's injuries would be engaged in as part of the compensation for her employment; it was further contemplated
that the very premises on which she was injured would be
used by her in engaging in that activity. In the Liberty
Mutual case, swimming was purely a personal diversion on
the part of the injured claimant; it had not been discussed
at the time of his employment; it played no part in the
compensation for the employment as petitioner's horseback
riding did in the case at bar. No permission to swim was
given the claimant in the Liberty Mutual case; specific permission to ride was given petitioner here.
[3] There is ample authority to support petitioner's contention that an injury is compensable if it results from an
activity contemplated by the employment, even though it
occurs in a location not directly owned or controlled by the
employer (State Camp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
194 Cal. 28, 31 [227 P. 168] ; Associated lnclem. Corp. v.
Industrial Ace. Com., 18 Cal.2d 40, 45 [112 P.2d 615] ;
Freire v. Matson Navigation Co., 19 Cal.2d 8, 11 [118 P.2d

8
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>Ve held in Associal eel I ndem.
Cal.2d 40, 45
P.2d 615],
may be considered as upon his employer's premises
time of the
it is not necessarily essential that
be circumscribed by walls or barriers (21Jakins v.
Ace.
198 Cal. 698 [247 P. 202, 49 A.L.R.
) ; nor that the same be wholly under the control of the
(Globe Inclem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 208
P.
; Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
181 Cal. 300 [184 P. 1]; Starr Piano Co. v. Industrial
181 Cal. 433 [184 P. 860].)" The employee in
the Associated case was on some railroad tracks ·when he was
and the court concluded that he was on the premises
the consent and approval of his employer, and was
his duties thereon in going from the depot to the
Petitioner contends that she >vas denied due process
because of the referee's refusal to admit in evidence
written by .M:rs. Scholler to petitioner's counsel. The
contained a statement that the counselors' recreation
>vas considered part of their compensation and that it ''was
'' at the time of their employment. It is apparent
letter constituted an admission and should have been
in evidence when it \Yas offered at the first hearing
Mrs. Scholler was not available as a witness. She testiat a later hearing to the same effect when
''I mentioned at the time of the interview [with
vYe do say that the compensation by no means
we are trying to pay you for your services but
recognize it is just a very little bit but we hope that
you are there you will also have been compensated to
some extent to take advantage of the recreational opportunity
that you can do as a counselor that you can't do ordinarily."
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~~-.c··-~·v·- added.) In view of the above
and the
liberal rules of evidence prevailing in the Industrial Accident
Commission hearings (Lab. Code, § 5708) it does not appear
that petitioner was prejudiced in any way by the exclusion
of the letter.
Respondents' final contention is that whether or not an
was suffered in the course of
is one of
fact and that the finding of the commission is conclusive.
[6] Where, as here, there is no real dispute as to the facts,
the question of whether an injury was suffered in the course
of employment is one of law and a purported finding of fact
on that question is not binding on an appellate court (Southern
Pac. Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 CaL 782, 783 [151 P. 277, L.R.A.
1916E 916]; Hines v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 184 CaL 1, 4 [192
P. 859, 14 A.L.R. 720]; Crown City Lodge v. Indttstrial Ace.
Corn., 10 Cal.App.2d 83, 87 [51 P.2d 143]; San Diego 1'. & S.
Bank v. County of San Diego, 16 Cal.2d 142, 153 [105 P.2d
94, 133 A.L.R. 416] ) .
Particularly applicable in this connection is the holding in
WinterY. Industr·ial Ace. Com., 129 Cal.App.2d 174, 178-179
l276 P.2d 689], where the court, in annulling an order of the
commission denying compensation, had this to say: ''The
respondent commission argues that even if it be conceded an
award could be made upon the fads presented here, yet the
issue was one of fact to be resolYed by the commission, and
that the commission's resolution cannot be set aside on
review. \Ve do not agree. The facts themselves are without
dispute and hence the issue is one of law unless opposing
inferences can be drawn, one set supporting an award, the
other supporting the denial thereof. \V e think no such opposing inferences are permissible here and that the undisputed
facts compel the conclusion that petitioner's injury arose out
of and in the course of his employment. It was the employment which created the facts and conditions that brought
petitioner to the premises of his employer to engage in the
permitted and encouraged recreational activity. 'l'he course of
the flying golf ball could only be intercepted at one place
and the presence there of petitioner was due to his employment.'' The same holding applies with equal force here.
It was the employment which created the conditions which
brought petitioner to engage in the permitted and encouraged
recreational activity. The question is, therefore, one of law
for this court to decide. It appears to us that petitioner's

c
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occurred in and arose out of the course of her emis annulled.
ancl 'l'raynor, J., concurred.
dissent.
commission found that Miss Reinert ''did
noL sustain any injury arising out of or occurring in the
of said employment.'' The majority opinion annuls
based upon this finding and concludes as a matter
that the injury here "occurred in and arose out of
il~<' eonrse of her employment." I am of the view that the
opinion has usurped the fact-finding function of
the eommission by drawing inferenees ·which are contrary
to tl10se drmn1 by the eommission, and in some instances, conto the evidence itself; and that the majority opinion has
reaehed conclusions whieh eannot be justified.
Reinert ·was employed as a lifeguard and swimming
eomJselor at the Girl Scout Camp following her interview
with Mrs. Scholler. The recreational features of the work
discussed at the interview as well as the arrangements
frre time during which the members of the staff could
lea the camp and do anything that they might choose to do.
::\o emphasis was placed upon the particular nature of any
time activity such as horseback riding, nor was Miss
I tPi ncrt thereafter "required to obtain permission for the
recreational activity away from camp in which she
\Yished to engage,'' as indicated in the majority opinion.
\Yith respect to horseback riding, Miss Reinert testified as
follows: '' Q. Did she (Mrs. Seholler) say something about
any opportunities to go horseback riding by yourself
or when you were not with the little girls? A. \Veil, I don't
remember ·whe1 her she (lid or not." :Miss Heinert learned after
at camp that she could go horseback riding in her free
on payment of $1.00 per hour to ·wilson's Stables, which
the fixed charge for ''all organized camps-whether campor staff personnel.''
Under the evidence, the referee of the commission reported
''It is my opinion that the claimant in exercising her
on the afternoon of July 30, 1954, to join with other
in horseback riding did not engage in any activity
whieh can be designated as arising out of and occurring m
thr course of her employment.'' And the commission, in
l"'uu.'-'"·"

360

REINERT

v.

INDUSTRIAL

Ace. CoM.

[46 C.2d

said that ''. . . there
could be awarded
be held to arise out of and occur iu the course
" It further said: "It is true that many
are attractive because of recreational
of the
of
which are available in the
This in the
of the
sion of the mantle of the '
over such recreational facilities so as to make an
tained while the employee enjoys such recreation
sable.''
The facts in the present case are neither unusual nor complicated. The record presents the ordinary situation where
an employee accepts a particular employment because of the
desirable nature of the work and because of the opportunities
afforded during her free time for recreational activities which
she enjoys. It is a matter of common knowledge that many
persons accept such desirable employment each year in the
recreational camps of our character building agencies, receiving their sustenance and little or no additional compensation.
Similarly, many persons accept employment each year with
commercial enterprises in our resort areas. No doubt, most
of these persons are induced, at least to some extent, to accept
such employment by the lure of the numerous recreational
activities which may be enjoyed by the employees in their
free time. Thus, in a very loose sense of the word, it may
be said that they find some ''compensation'' in the enjoyment
of their free time activities, but it cannot be said that these
free time activities, away from the premises of the employer
and beyond the sphere of any right of control by the employer,
constitute "part of the employment" or "part of the compensation to be paid by the employer for petitioner's work," as
stated in the majority opinion. The employer here paid
nothing, directly or indirectly, in connection with the employees' free time horseback riding but, on the contrary, the
employees paid directly to the stable all charges which they
incurred for such riding.
It is significant that neither the place where the accident
occurred, the equipment being used, or the nature of the
activity was such as to give the employer any right of control
of the employee's free time recreational activity at the time
and place where the injury occurred. The stable was conducted by an independent third party at a location approximately lYz miles from the camp of the employer and the
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Water
, and Arabian American OU Co. v. Industrial
94 OaLApp.2d 388
P.2d 732], in which
was denied to
who were
while
in the permitted use of their employers' equipment
time recreational
away from the premises
the nature
is no
on which Miss Reinert was injured. It shows
''That trip had
to do with anyone's duties in
with the camp"; that her superior had "no interest
activities in their free time" but "just hoped they
time": that on the afternoon in question "the
vvas considered free time for

''checked out and checked in'' ; that the purpose
1vas ''Just so I lmc1v where
1vere goingparents came to look for them in an emergency
" 1\Iiss Reinert testified that it was a "voluntary matter"
"to decide to go
" that "I wasn't busy,
I would like to go horseback riding, and
·went to ::Yirs. Scholler and asked her if there is anything
and she said there wasn't, so I went riding." It thus
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appears that the ''permission'' to which reference is made
in the
opinion amounted to nothing more than permission for the allowance of free time in addition to the
day
and that the employees were ''encouraged''
to go horseback
only in the sense that they were ento use their free time to engage in any recreational
of their own
The employees were not
to go horseback
at any time
their
and Miss Reinert could have decided on the afterto engage in mountain climbing, boating,
sun-bathing, fishing, touring in her own
car, patronizing places of public accommodation or amusement,
or any other activity which might be enjoyed in the general
area. It was she who suggested that some of her coworkers
go with her on their free time on that day, first for a ride
and then for a swim at a lake located five miles from the
camp of her employer. Some followed her sug·gestion, and
others did not, but the fact remains that she and the others
were at liberty to go wherever they chose and to do anything
they desired to do. Such activity was typical of the free time
activity enjoyed by employees generally when relieved from
the duties of their employment and cannot be said to be ''part
of the employment.''
The cases upon which the majority opinion relies do not
sustain the conclusion reached therein. Typical of the cited
cases are those in which injuries have been held compensable
nndrr certain circumstances when they occurred on premisrs
of the employer (Pacific Indent. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
26 Cal.2d 509 [159 P.2d 625]; California Cas. Indem. Exch. v.
Industrial Ace. Com., 21 Cal.2d 751 [135 P.2d 158]; Winter v.
Indush·ial Ace. Com., 129 Cal.App.2d 174 [276 P.2d 689];
Employers' etc. CorzJ. v. Industn:al Ace. Com., 37 Cal.App.2d
567 [ 99 P .2d 1089] ) or at places customarily used as the immediate approaches to the premises of the employer (Freire v.
Matson Navigation Co., 19 Cal.2d 8 [118 P.2d 809]; State
Camp. Irts. Fund v. Industrial Ace. Com., 194 Cal. 28 [227
P. 168]) or during brief deviations for personal reasons from
the actual work of the employer, or at a time when the
employee could be said to be acting both on behalf of himself
and his employer (Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
31 Cal.2d 856 [193 P.2d 745] ; Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
lnd1tstTial Ace. Corn., 28 Cal.2d 756 [172 P.2d 1]; Western
Pac. R. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 193 Cal. 413 [224 P. 754] ;
Western Pipe etc. Co. v. IndustTial Ace. Com., 49 Cal.App.2d

REINERT

INDUSTRIAL

Ace. Co]I,L

363

[46 C.2d 349; 294 P.2d 713]

) . These cases demonstrate that the courts
and
endeavored to
rule of liberal construction (Lab. Code, § 3202) in deteruu ..~···,., whether any
injury ''arose out of and in the
of" the employment as
by our statute. (Lab.
§ 3600.) However, courts may not in
conscience
the
of the statute under the
and I am of the
that the
here results in such nullification.
respect to the letter which was denied admission in
I agree that it was covered in substance by the
testimony of Mrs. Scholler; but I do not believe that the
the word ''compensate,' or ''compensation,'' considered
context in either the letter or the testimony, would support
or conclusion that the employee's free time activities
own choosing, far removed from the employer's premises
outside of the sphere of any right of control by the
were "part of her employment" or that the
in such activities "arose out of or in the course of"
employment. On the other hand, I am of the view that the
finding to the contrary was abundantly supby the evidence.
I would affirm the award.

J., and McComb, J., concurred.
'rhe petition of respondents Central Orange County Girl
Scout Council and Globe Indemnity Co. for a rehearing
denied April 18, 1956. Spence, J., Schauer, J., and
J., were of the opinion that the petition should be

